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Criminal Law: 
Taking the Constitution Seriously? Three Approaches to Law’s 






The post-Warren Court’s routine findings of constitutional 
compliance by law enforcement, the courtroom apparatus, and 
correctional agencies are of no surprise to anyone studying the American 
criminal process. Legal realists have long come to regard doctrinal 
niceties as tools that render legitimacy to intrusive, abusive, and punitive 
state practices.2  
But upon closer examination, the Supreme Court’s usage of 
constitutional standards as a way to “kosherize” inferior defense quality,3 
prosecutorial misconduct,4 and correctional abuses,5 as well as policing 
practices,6 prosecutorial discretion,7 and plea-bargain abuses,8 merits 
deeper attention. When the Supreme Court expresses deference to 
authority, relying on a particular standard of review and making that 
standard the issue rather than the rights violation in the particular case,9 
does it “believe” in what it says, or is it cynically exploiting 
constitutional doctrine to garner legitimacy? And if the Constitution is 
more than mere window dressing to advance the interests of the 
powerful, in what ways is it “real”? 
To answer these questions, I juxtapose two common approaches to 
criminal-courtroom policy: the legal-model approach and the 
sociological-empirical approach. Each approach offers a valuable 
                                                 
 1. Lightly edited and adapted from Hadar Aviram, Taking the Constitution 
Seriously? Three Approaches to Law’s Competence in Addressing Authority and 
Professionalism, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich & 
Alexandra Natapoff eds. 2017).  
 2. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 4. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 5. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1872).  
 6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 7. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
 8. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 9. See Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in 
THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 111 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds. 
2017). 
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interpretation of legal policies and goals, emphasizing certain factors that 
account for legal practices in the field; however, each of them fails to 
account for other factors, thus incompletely explicating the criminal 
process. I then use Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory as a third 
approach that takes both the Constitution and its limitations seriously. As 
I argue, systems theory complements doctrinal analysis and sociolegal 
critique by showing how the very nature of constitutional 
communications limits their usefulness for criminal-justice reform.  
 
The Legal-Model Approach: The Constitution as a Value Choice 
 
One perspective on the post-Warren Court’s forgiving approach 
toward the criminal-justice apparatus views the Constitution as a vehicle 
for advancing one set of legal values over another. A convenient starting 
point is Herbert Packer’s “Two Models of the Criminal Process.”10 
Analyzing the Warren Court revolution as it was occurring, Packer 
transcended the government/defendant dichotomy that dominated 
contemporary discourse, arguing that the due process revolution 
consisted of a shift along a continuum between two “ideal types.” On one 
end lay the Crime Control Model, which prioritized efficiency, 
advocating for reliance on police and prosecution powers under the 
assumption that any defendant that made it past these checks into the trial 
system was “presumptively guilty.” This model relied on bargaining and 
finality and shied away from trials and appeals. On the other end lay the 
Due Process Model, which prioritized avoidance of wrongful 
convictions, treating the criminal justice apparatus with suspicion and 
allowing for constitutional challenges and ample post-conviction 
review.11 Charles Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin argue for a 
subsequent pendulum swing back toward Crime Control in the post-
Warren-Court era, identifying four themes: a focus on factual 
guilt/innocence, echoing Packer’s “presumption of guilt,” a shift from 
bright-line constitutional rules to flexible, “totality of the circumstances” 
tests, greater belief in the integrity of the police and prosecution, and 
greater deference to state courts.12 Packer himself, a due-process 
                                                 
 10. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). 
 11. Elsewhere, I have argued that due process has two aspects, formalism and 
fairness. See Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due 
Process Model, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (2011).  
 12. CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 4-5 (5th ed. 2008). 
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enthusiast, expressed on his deathbed in the early 1970s disillusionment 
with the Warren Court’s project.  
Many have used Packer’s models as a springboard for suggesting 
their own models, which were regarded as preferable or more realistic 
representations of the criminal process. But even Packer’s analysis, 
which imbues the Court’s constitutional stance with a more nuanced 
worldview than mere partisanship, is fraught with the naïveté of what 
Hunt and Wickham call the “intellectual insularity” of legal 
scholarship.13 For Packer, whether the justices subscribe to crime control 
or due process, they are still, in good faith, applying universal principles 
to specific cases by classifying real-life situations into preexisting legal 
“ideal types,” which they apply universally and objectively.14 This 
approach does not see the Court as a political institution embedded in the 
broader socioeconomic, racial and political context.  
Packer would perceive the examples from the Court listed above as a 
manifestation of the crime-control model. Creating and reinforcing low 
expectations from defense attorneys is a vote of confidence not only in 
public defense but also in the initial screening process by the police and 
the prosecution; if a case has made it to trial, the defendant is likely 
guilty anyway, and guaranteeing the quality of his defense is less crucial. 
This approach explains not only the performance prong of Strickland but 
also its prejudice prong: the defendant was probably rightfully convicted, 
and, therefore, any post-conviction debate about defense flaws is moot. 
Similarly, Batson and McClesky can be explained as a crime-control 
expression of faith in the system’s fairness; the defendant’s probable 
guilt makes the possibility of racial bias less worrisome. Both of these 
scenarios, as well as the third—the case of correctional practices—also 
strongly indicate the Courts’ crime-control commitment to finality and 
impatience for postconviction inquiries.  
But these three cases also expose the weaknesses of a Packerian 
approach as the ultimate path to understanding the post-Warren Court. 
Why does the Court place such trust in public defense? Does the Court’s 
faith in the system’s ability to overcome errors override what the justices 
surely know about racial discrimination and minority overrepresentation? 
And how does the Court benefit from its wholesale support of 
correctional practices?  
                                                 
 13. ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF 
LAW AS GOVERNANCE 40 (1994). 
 14. David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short and Happy Life of the Law and 
Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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Finally, the Packerian approach lacks historical sensitivity. It tells us 
little about why the Warren Court shifted from crime control to due 
process and why the pendulum has swung back. These questions are 
better addressed by the second approach. 
 
Sociolegal Approaches: The Constitution in Service of 
Institutional Legitimacy and Political Entrenchment 
 
The second approach is more frequently espoused by social scientists 
examining the criminal process, often using empirical tools. For 
simplification purposes, this approach encompasses various perspectives 
that see the Court as one of many sociopolitical institutions, with 
pragmatic concerns, interests, and obligations beyond adherence to a set 
of values promoted by constitutional provisions.  
I identify two strains within the sociolegal approach. The first 
focuses on factors endogenous to the criminal process and on the Court’s 
role as an institution within the system. Such works advocate rejecting 
the notion of the system as a rational apparatus with a single goal in 
mind, opting instead to see it as constructed of many individuals with 
different and often conflicting roles, and handling a variety of 
professional, administrative and personal constraints.15 While this 
literature emerges mostly from lower-court ethnographies, it is 
nonetheless relevant to the conversation about the Supreme Court in that 
it draws attention to the “real” reasons why the Court accommodates 
incompetent lawyers and thinly veiled, racially motivated jury selection 
tactics. The Supreme Court affirms the experiences of state judges who 
routinely encounter the “repeat players” in the system: defense attorneys 
and prosecutors.16 Since the continued collaboration of these participants 
is essential to keep the wheels of the criminal justice machine turning, 
their interests are accommodated at the expense of those of the 
defendants, who are “one-shotters.” This principle holds for federal 
litigation of state correctional practices: The court is well aware of the 
need to procure the state’s collaboration, and therefore gears itself more 
toward conciliatory compromises and consent decrees.17 
                                                 
 15. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); Malcolm Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice 
System: An Organizational Approach, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 407 (1972). 
 16. See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE (1977); PETER 
NARDULLI ET AL., TENOR OF JUSTICE (1988). 
 17. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE (1991). 
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This literature is particularly useful regarding ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims because in that situation, the defense attorneys’ 
interests line up with those of the court and against their clients. 
Described in early examples of this literature as “con men” who trick 
their clients into pleading guilty to save everyone’s time,18 the lawyers 
quickly develop proficiency in identifying prototypes of cases—“normal 
crimes”—and perfect ways of negotiating for pleas based on these 
generalizations.19 
The second strain examines the creation and administration of the 
criminal project as a product of the larger social structure, focusing on its 
reinforcement of patterns of power and inequality. Works by Marxist 
social historians and conflict criminologists address the emergence of 
laws aimed mainly at controlling and oppressing disenfranchised 
populations, mostly by criminalizing their behavior, such as vagrancy 
and poaching—crimes created and enforced to protect the property 
interests of powerful social groups. Similarly, such accounts highlight 
the stratifying effect of drug policy, death penalty enforcement, and the 
deliberate choices involved in the criminal prosecution of slaves in the 
American South. The emergence of penal practices, often shrouded in 
therapeutic, ostensibly benevolent reforms, is also interpreted as systemic 
support for oppression.20  
Scholars disagree on the level of autonomy they ascribe to law 
within the power structure. Instrumental Marxists go as far as to claim 
that law is entirely subservient to the mode of production.21 Structural 
Marxists espouse a more nuanced approach, acknowledging that law 
retains a certain level of autonomy; rather than automatically supporting 
the interests of power groups, the law sometimes offers hope to weaker 
groups, thus maintaining its appearance of universal and equal 
                                                 
 18. Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: 
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15 (1967). 
 19. David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a 
Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965). 
 20. E.g., TONY PLATT, THE TRIUMPH OF BENEVOLENCE: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE 
AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 
(1980); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE 
UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993). 
 21. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
(1939).  
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application and guaranteeing that, in the long run, the power structure 
will prevail.22  
These approaches clearly support the observation that the Court 
obtains legitimacy by supporting the interests of power groups. For 
example, by supporting the fiction of adequate criminal representation 
via the “effective assistance of counsel” test, the Court justifies abusive 
and punitive practices. The defense attorney’s presence becomes a fig 
leaf behind which injustices can hide. Similarly, the façade of racial 
blindness diverts attention from the myriad racialized practices in the 
criminal process. And finally, the assertion that inmates are being 
punished for their crimes—with all practices associated with their 
incarceration conveniently labeled as “punishment” and “not 
punishment”—masks the severe deprivation of fellow humans’ basic 
material, social, and medical needs. Even the sporadic exceptions to this 
pattern of finding counsel’s assistance to be adequate23 nevertheless 
conform to this overall paradigm. This handful of exceptions creates an 
illusionary impression of equality and justice, numbing us to the robust 
body of opposite decisions.  
The problem with this approach is its non-falsifiability. When the 
Court rules for the state, we ascribe that to its support of the existing 
power structure. When it rules in favor of the defendants or inmates, we 
ascribe that to the need to maintain false consciousness and legitimacy. 
Only when the abuse of power is so blatant that a pro-government 
decision would cause outrage does the Court shy away from it and give a 
handout to the disenfranchised. The extent to which the Court succeeds 
in predicting the reaction to its rulings is an index of its political 
astuteness. 
But even if it is profitable for the Supreme Court to support the 
system at the expense of the disenfranchised and downtrodden, why is 
the Constitution such a convenient vehicle? If the Constitution is such a 
powerful legitimizing tool, why is its ability to provide satisfying 





                                                 
 22. Alan Stone, The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure 
Archetype, 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 39 (1985). 
 23. E.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 
(2012); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
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A Third Approach: The Constitution and Its Interpretation as an Index of 
How Law Treats Authority and Professionalism 
 
The third approach transcends the doctrinal insularity of the 
Packerian perspective, as well as the dismissiveness toward law, and the 
Constitution, of the sociolegal perspective. While the legal or political 
consequences of the Court’s approach matter, of course, this approach 
examines the issue through a discursive lens: How does law, in itself, 
think? This “discursive perspective”24 focuses not on the ontological 
nature of reality, but on the role of the Constitution in propagating a 
given view of reality. It helpfully illuminates law as a system without 
cynically sacrificing the importance of law itself to the result. 
For our purposes, the relevant aspect of systems theory, as espoused 
by Niklas Luhmann, is its concern with law’s boundaries, self-
production, and relationship with external structures.25 The unit of 
analysis for the theory is a “communication.” Luhmann defines “law” as 
a set of legal communications, which converse with each other and refer 
to each other. It is through these communications that law attains a 
“mind” and a perspective independent from, and unrelated to, that of 
human legal actors. What distinguishes legal and non-legal 
communications is their function: the maintenance (stabilization) of 
expectations (e.g., that actors in the criminal justice system will 
adequately represent defendants, guarantee racial neutrality, and treat 
inmates decently) in the face of disappointments (e.g., an unprofessional 
lawyer, a racially-biased jury, or an abusive prison warden). The main 
distinction made by legal communications in respect to these behaviors is 
the legal/illegal dichotomy.26 The communications which determine 
which behaviors will be deemed “legal” and which will be regarded as 
“illegal” are contingent upon the concept of justice, which often 
manifests itself through equality (the equal/unequal distinction).  
These distinctions made by the system’s communications and 
operations are exclusive to the system. Law, like other systems, is an 
autopoietic system, in which “everything that is used as a unit by the 
system is produced by the system itself.”27 Since the system consists of 
                                                 
 24. NIELS ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN, DISCURSIVE ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES: 
UNDERSTANDING FOUCAULT, KOSELLECK, LACLAU, LUHMANN (2003).  
 25. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 47 (2004). 
 26. Jean Clam, The Specific Autopoiesis of Law: Between Derivative Autonomy and 
Generalised Paradox, in LAW’S NEW BOUNDARIES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL 
AUTOPOIESIS (Jiri Priban & David Nelken eds. 2001). 
 27. ANDERSEN, supra note 24. 
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communications, and the communications use distinctions unique to law, 
it can only converse with itself, using its own terms and distinctions.28 
Importantly, as a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating system, law supplies 
its own legitimacy using internal tools and referring back to them for 
validity.29  
Law, argues Luhmann, operates in a universe of systems, and 
addresses questions that come up in other systems. These questions, 
however, do not translate well across systems, because systems are 
cognitively open but operationally closed to each other; they can 
communicate about each other but not directly to each other. Whenever a 
system is irritated by an external event, or an external perspective from a 
different discipline, a structural coupling between the two systems may 
occur: the first system may choose, through its own operations and 
distinctions, to select the second system; the first system then 
communicates about the second system using the first system’s own 
distinctions, vocabulary and inner logic.  
Law’s form of operative closure is normative closure; while 
maintaining cognitive openness, and being exposed to other systems 
through the cases presented to the system or the operation of political 
institutions that surround it, law chooses to assimilate issues and events 
based on its fundamental legal/illegal distinction.  
When the Constitution is irritated by evidence of unprofessional 
defense attorneys, racial biases, or cruel and indifferent jailers, it has to 
translate this evidence to a question it can comprehend and answer. 
These big problems have to be reduced to binary questions—namely, 
whether a given practice with which the system is confronted falls above 
or below a certain threshold—before they can be addressed by legal 
communications.  
Note the systemic poverty of the Court’s approach in the criminal-
justice examples and its inadequacy in capturing and addressing them 
properly. Effective assistance of counsel—or, more clearly put, whether 
counsel performance is legal/illegal in the sense that it falls beneath some 
minimum threshold—is a very limited way to address quality, 
professionalism, agency, budget constraints, and any other issue 
stemming from the dark side of Gideon. Similarly, a deep conversation 
about the ways in which racism affects the criminal process is translated 
to the impoverished, limited binary question whether the outcome was 
                                                 
 28. Michael King, You Have to Start Somewhere, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND 
TRADITIONAL VALUES 3 (G. Douglas & L. Sebba eds. 1998). 
 29. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW 
(A. Sarat & T. R. Kearns. eds. 1991). 
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legal/illegal, decided based on whether it was unequal enough to fall 
beneath the legality threshold. And broad questions about our trust in the 
humanity and professionalism of correctional staff, which could raise 
issues of causality and situational dynamics,30 are translated to the 
impoverished, limited binary question whether the treatment of the 
inmates was legal/illegal in the sense that it fell beneath a minimum 
threshold of conditions. 
In these three situations, and many more, the Constitution has to 
consider (or confront) questions to which it is cognitively open: What 
professionalism means, how professionalism affects justice, and how 
professionalism may be promoted. But its limitations and internal rules 
mean that it can only converse about these issues (and not with other 
systems that might tackle these questions differently) in a normatively 
closed way, that is, through its binary threshold framework. 
This also explains another discontent with the Court’s approach: 
setting constitutional standards not only “kosherizes” current practices, 
but also acts as a barrier to future litigation. Law’s self-referential 
qualities ensure that the next time an irritant invades the legal 
conversation, it will refer back to itself, its usual modes of understanding 
and decision, and its operative rules, in providing an answer. This 




One possible way to analyze the three approaches is to regard the 
legal approach as what judges say they do, the sociolegal approach as 
what judges do, and the systems-theory approach as what the interaction 
between the constitution and the outside world does. Systems theory 
cannot provide a prescriptive mandate to judges, nor can it blur, in itself, 
the line between the constitution and the realities of the criminal process. 
What systems theory offers us is a modicum of modesty when 
expecting great things from the courts. If what we need are better defense 
attorneys, juries, and correctional officers, hanging our hopes on the 






                                                 
 30. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 
(1974).  
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